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Is Guanxi Universal in China? Some Evidence of a Paradoxical Shift  
 
 
 
Abstract 
The article reports on a study to examine the application of guanxi attributes and the 
pathways linking them to success and performance in the context of business-to-business 
relationships in the Chinese diamond industry. We draw on and adapt the Ganqing, Renqing 
and Xinren (GRX) scale to reveal a paradox in terms of how business is conventionally 
conducted. This is interesting because in Western markets that are typically governed by 
arms-length transactions the diamond industry is somewhat unique, as it is built on very close 
socially driven relationships. The paradox also occurs in the Chinese context, as the opposite 
is prevalent i.e., in a nation that often relies on social guanxi ties to drive business, the 
diamond industry is heavily characterized by a somewhat antagonistic arms-length approach. 
The study pieces together and tests a concept drawing on a sample of 212 diamond merchant 
traders operating in China. We discover that interpersonal trust (Xinren) has a positive 
influence on both emotional attachment (Ganqing) and obligational favor (Renqing), but has 
a direct negative influence on Performance (the paradox). Ganqing serves to positively 
influence Performance and Renqing leads to greater Satisfaction - which in turn has a 
positive bearing on Performance. Several implications are extracted from the study that 
provide useful insights into the ways that guanxi is perhaps becoming more or less prevalent 
in China.   
 
Key words: China, Diamond Industry, Social Capital, Governance Mechanism, GRX Scale, 
Guanxi, Performance. 
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Introduction 
The past three decades have seen a far-reaching and fundamental transformation in 
China's economic infrastructure and business environment (Gu et al., 2008). During 
this period China has completely transformed itself, moving from a centrally planned 
administrative system to a social market economy (Barbieri et al., 2010). In parallel, 
modern China has evolved from being one of the world’s poorest economies to being 
a promising political leader with a growing and affluent middle class (Berger et al., 
2013). Experiencing such rapid transition brings about many opportunities and threats 
for business. In recent years much research attention has been directed towards China 
and its various industries, however, the Chinese diamond industry has been largely 
under researched, as indeed was the diamond industry as a whole until relatively 
recently (Li et al., 2009; Bernstein, 1992; Scott and Yelowitz, 2010; Spar, 1994).  
While ten years ago China was fairly insignificant in terms of trading in 
diamonds, it is now the world’s second-largest diamond processing center and has the 
second-largest consumer market with the highest global growth rate (Berger and 
Herstein, 2014; Even-Zohar, 2007). Despite such a lucrative market with rising 
consumption (Haris and Cai, 2002), the industry is problematic and anecdotal 
evidence based on discussions with diamond traders suggests some degree of fraud 
and corruption exists. The objective of this study is to acquire greater insights into the 
Chinese Diamond industry in order to shed more light on how political, economic and 
cultural forces shape market exchanges and business in China. Lessons learnt from 
this industry may influence other sectors and this is of high relevance to both scholars 
and practitioners alike as they grapple with such factors that lead to success and 
improved performance when operating in modern day China. 
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The GRX Scale and Hypotheses Development 
The social governance mechanism which Chinese firms rely on is known as guanxi 
i.e. the relationship connections that individuals build in order to influence or secure 
resources (Fan, 2002; Hwang et al., 2009; Berger et al., 2013). The nature of guanxi 
represents a dynamic social network which needs cultivating, otherwise such ties can 
dissipate (Guthrie, 1998; Yang, 1994). Social relationships play a critical role when 
doing business in China and are extremely important for Westerners and Chinese 
alike (Styles and Ambler, 2003). Research suggests that cultivating good guanxi 
connections can expedite economic exchange which can leverage performance 
advantages (Barnes et al., 2011; Yen et al., 2011). In today's competitive business 
environment, firms from diverse countries need to consider how they can incorporate 
such factors into their business strategies (Cadogan et al., 2006). However, the notion 
of guanxi appears to be absent in the Chinese diamond industry, other than for the use 
of government connections to circumvent onerous regulations.  
 In order to examine this phenomenon in more detail, we decided to adapt the 
GRX scale (Ganqing, Renqing, and Xinren), developed by Yen et al., (2011) which 
represents a useful tool for analyzing social network relationships in a Chinese 
context. The scale consists of three relationship dimensions which Figure 1 expands 
on.  As the diamond industry is a relatively closed industry that is globally trust based, 
it is our intention to examine quantitatively if inter-personal trust (Xinren) forms the 
foundation for effective relationship building as was suggested by Yen et al., (2011). 
We therefore draw on insights from business practitioners operating in the sector who 
consider trust at a personal level (or the lack of it) as an initiator or trigger to drive 
trade. Our concept therefore posits two pathways leading from interpersonal trust 
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(Xinren) for enhancing Performance through Ganqing, Renqing and Satisfaction. We 
consider these latter constructs to have a positive influence on Performance i.e. sales 
growth and greater profitability (Chadee and Zhang, 2000).  
=== 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
=== 
Xinren  is mostly used as a verb and is translated as: to trust in, to believe in, to 
confide in, to have confidence (or faith) in, to put stock in, to rely on; to place (or put) 
dependence on one and give credit to (Eye, 2007). In emerging economies, where 
legal regulations are often not fully developed, trust frequently plays a crucial role to 
facilitate business and eliminate risk or opportunistic behavior (Wong and Leung, 
2001). Xinren plays a significant role in Chinese culture and is measured by the 
degree to which one keeps both written and verbal promises (Yen et al., 2011). It is 
founded on an individual’s history and their reputational standing in society. It refers 
to the aptitude of an individual to trust another because she/he is considered 
trustworthy or capable. In a Chinese context, the notion of trust is based on Confucian 
values, which have a significant influence on individual behavior and is associated 
with successful relationship building (Tsang, 1998). This is because trust is often 
treated as the most fundamental element by the Chinese and mutual trust must be 
established first, before business transactions will follow (Arregle et al., 2000). Based 
on Confucian principles, which are ingrained in Chinese cultural values, individuals 
are relational creatures who depend on properly differentiated personal associations 
with other individuals to maintain some degree of social order and stability. Hence, 
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establishing and building healthy interpersonal relations represents a key part of day-
to-day living in China and tends to consume a significant amount of time, effort and 
resources. Through these relations, the Chinese frequently achieve a desired 
harmonious working environment which can yield long-term benefits. 
 Ganqing, which can be translated as feelings or affection, draws on social 
connections between relationship parties and considers the degree of emotional 
empathy that is apparent at the individual level (Tsang, 1998; Barnes et al., 2011). It 
is the emotional side of guanxi which is based on positive mutual feelings to one 
another or a good rapport that is normally built over time following social 
interactions. Ganqing often occurs when people work together, co-operate and get 
along with one another (Jacobs, 1979). In some literature, the concept of Ganqing is 
closely linked with social bonding and personal friendship, as both are used to 
emphasize the degree of feelings between parties (Mavondo and Rodrigo, 2001; 
Wilson, 1995). In China, building affective personal relationships with a business 
partner provides the flexibility needed to deal with changing circumstantial conditions 
as witnessed in the diamond industry. It is therefore very important to initially 
develop a sense of trust in order for greater social bonding to occur. Based on the 
notion that personal credibility serves as a pre-requisite for facilitating relational 
exchange in the Chinese context we hypothesize that:  
H1: High levels of Xinren will positively enhance Ganqing in the relationship. 
 
Renqing: Relationship building in China often goes beyond an emotional attachment 
and instead of focusing on the feelings part of the relationship, Renqing emphasizes 
human obligations and favors (Kipnis, 1997). Similar to favor in English it can both 
be given and received as a transaction (Yen et al., 2011) and reflects reciprocity 
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(Chan, 1963; Fang, 1999). It is the level of human benevolence and nepotism that 
stems from the exchange of favors or even gifts (Shou et al., 2011). It creates a bond 
of commitment through reciprocity and the need to repay favor at a later stage (Choi 
and Kim, 2010). Other ways to nurture Renqing include providing support and 
assistance to an exchange partner at a time of need (Gu et al., 2008). It emphasizes the 
significance of networks in interpersonal relationships and is based on a unique 
system consisting of the reciprocal exchange of favors and gifts that strengthens 
personal ties (Yeung and Tung 1996). When trust between both exchange parties is 
strong, each can cooperate and mutually help one another (Cadogan et al., 2006). 
Once established, both parties will also have a strong desire to commit more to the 
other and reciprocate. The construct of Satisfaction is grounded on the basis of which 
reciprocal exchange can potentially leverage the expectation set by the exchange 
partner. In other words the reciprocal nature of Renqing can trigger Satisfaction with a 
particular relationship party due to the beneficial exchange that is transferred from 
one party to another over time.  
H2: High levels of Xinren will positively enhance Renqing in the relationship. 
H3: High levels of Renqing will positively enhance Satisfaction in the 
relationship. 
 
Satisfaction has often been referred to as a crucial component of relationship quality 
that can enhance performance (Barnes et al., 2011). It is used to measure how 
satisfied one is with a particular exchange. Without satisfaction, the chance of 
relationship disintegration is high (Coughlan et al. 2006). Similarly, the degree of 
affection can serve to strengthen the relationship and foster the potential for mutual 
success. This is because when an affective element is present in a relationship, parties 
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tend to have mutual feelings and share a willingness to support each other to attain 
successful outcomes. Following these arguments, we hypothesize that: 
 
H4: High levels of relationship Satisfaction will positively lead to greater 
Performance 
H5: High levels of Ganqing will positively lead to greater Performance 
 
Contextual Overview of the Chinese Diamond Industry 
China's diamond industry consists of three main sectors: diamond processing, 
diamond jewelry manufacturing and domestic diamond retail consumption. Diamond 
processing involves the sorting and cutting of rough diamonds into polished 
diamonds. China’s diamond processing production began in the 1980s, when the 
Jinghua Diamond Corporation started the country’s first large-scale diamond 
processing venture in Qingdao, Shandong province. In the 1990s the industry further 
expanded with business from Israel, Europe and other regions establishing diamond 
cutting centers in the Guangdong, Shandong and Shanghai regions, where local 
governmental officials were known not to enforce laws restricting the trade of 
diamonds (Even Zohar, 2007). By the 1990s, these diamond centers were the base for 
approximately seventy factories and trading firms, employing over 50,000 people, 
with an annual processing trade of 3 million carats. This volume positioned China as 
the second largest diamond producer in the world (Haris and Cai, 2002). In 2009, the 
value of China’s total trade (import and export) in diamond processing reached 
US$3.72 billion and in 2010 it exceeded $4 billion (Berger and Herstein, 2012).  
 China owed its rise as a major center for processing diamonds in part to its lax 
labor laws and its low cost, yet highly skilled workforce, as during the 1990s Chinese 
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manual workers represented the most productive workforce per dollar worldwide 
(Zhang, 1994). The growth of the Chinese diamond jewelry manufacturing sector also 
played a key role. For example, most of the world's jewelry setting is outsourced to 
China, but relatively little of this jewelry is developed by Chinese designers or sold 
directly in the Chinese market. In 2011, China accounted for 10% of the global 
diamond export market (surpassing $20 billion), with an average annual growth rate 
of 8% (Berger and Herstein, 2012). In addition, the domestic market has also opened 
up for economically priced diamond jewelry, which has led to the setting of the 
smallest of diamonds which are appealing to a growing segment of Chinese 
consumers (Li et al., 2009). 
 The structure of the Chinese diamond industry is complex and subject to 
frequent change. Figure 2 offers a simple overview of its structure. Trade in both 
rough and polished diamonds in China is authorized only through the Shanghai 
Diamond Exchange (SDE), otherwise no tax breaks will be given and maximum tax 
will be levied (Even-Zohar, 2007). Companies seeking to trade diamonds in China are 
required to become members of the SDE, for which they pay various membership fees 
and other indirect taxes. The SDE is owned by the Chinese government and a few 
well-known businessmen. Overseeing the SDE is the government-controlled Diamond 
Administration of China (DAC), which was established in 2000.    
          
======= 
Insert Figure 2 here 
======== 
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From the outside it seems that in recent years the Chinese diamond industry has 
undergone decentralization and rationalization. Tax reforms reduced the tax rate on 
polished diamonds to 17% in 2001 and then to 4% in 2006. Rough diamonds are tax-
exempt as long as trade is conducted through the SDE. The government made the 
regulations more transparent and created an industry infrastructure similar to those in 
the West. A closer examination however detects certain problems associated with how 
it functions. For example, the Chinese government still charges high taxes on the 
industry through indirect means and securely controls all its significant institutions i.e. 
all polished diamonds in China must have official certification in order to be sold 
legally. However, the Chinese certification agency is currently owned by the director 
of the DAC, who is also the spouse of a prominent Party official. In other words, “the 
government agency that provides grading certificates is the same agency that sets up 
the technical standards for grading and authorizes who can provide grading services” 
(Li et al., 2009, p. 463). As a result, Chinese businesses consider the grading system 
as a means of indirect taxation, rather than a way to build a strong ethical trading 
platform.  
 In addition to the conflicts of interest just outlined, the laws and regulations 
governing diamond firms are complex and subject to frequent modification by the 
government. As a result, diamond merchants tend to use their own relationships 
(guanxi) to bypass regulations on the supply side (Li et al., 2009). This is a key reason 
that while in theory all diamond imports must be processed through the SDE, in 
reality very little trade in polished diamonds takes place there, as most is conducted 
through the gray market (Berger and Herstein, 2012).  
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The Paradox in the Chinese Diamond Industry 
The Chinese diamond industry offers a valuable case study for researching the 
differences between relational and rule based business systems. The economic and 
physical characteristics of diamonds, i.e. their small size and high value makes them 
both easy and tempting to steal, hide and smuggle and therefore places a high burden 
on one’s business. This along with the fact that diamonds are difficult to authenticate, 
makes the industry vulnerable to fraud and corruption (Bernstein, 1992; Spar, 1994). 
In China much of the diamond trade takes place in illicit, semi-illicit and informal 
markets (Olson, 1992; Lu, 2009; Berger et al., 2013). 
 In Western societies, governance systems are highly developed, transparent 
and make use of legally binding written contracts (Choi, 1994). In contrast, Chinese 
businesses have historically relied on trust-based networks of social relationships i.e. 
guanxi, with less emphasis on written contractual forms (Yen et al., 2011). As a 
result, one might imagine that the Chinese diamond industry, characterized by a 
paucity of information, high indirect government involvement, high uncertainty, a 
weak legal system and a socially based culture would employ a governance system 
grounded on guanxi and social networks (Barnes et al., 2011; Yen et al., 2011). 
However, in China traders often work short term and transactionally, rather than using 
social networks, as they tend to function poorly (Li et al., 2009).  
 This study seeks to explore this paradox in the Chinese diamond industry of an 
inversion of the business model that tends to show differences between the West and 
East. Whereas Anglo-Saxon business culture is generally transaction based, the 
opposite occurs in China, which is a relationship orientated society. However the 
implementation of transaction based exchange models appears highly prevalent in 
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China’s diamond industry. In this study we aim to further examine the source and 
consequences of this paradox. 
 
Methodology 
We used a two stage methodology. The first stage was exploratory in nature and used 
qualitative tools. The second employed a quantitative approach using a two stage 
process. We specifically examined the existence of social networks in business to 
business relations using the GRX scale developed by Yen et al. (2011) to consider its 
components and their influence on satisfaction and performance. Following Brand 
and Slater’s (2003) argument that qualitative work should precede quantitative 
testing, we used a case study approach to shed light on the structural factors that affect 
business in the Chinese diamond industry (see also Burgelman, 1983; Eisenhardt, 
1989; Robertson, 1993, Welch, 2000; Zhang, 1994). Case study research is useful for 
focusing on understanding the dynamics present within specific settings (Eisenhardt, 
1989) i.e. the diamond industry here. 
 Through interviews with key players, we aimed to elucidate the various forces 
at work in the industry and examine the dynamics amongst them. This initial 
interview phase provided significant information on the intricacies of the reciprocal 
relations that would have been hard to capture in a meticulously structured research 
instrument or questionnaire (see Appendix A for an interview guide). Furthermore, it 
was intended to examine the validity of questions from the GRX scale in this rather 
unique context. In the first stage any misunderstanding of specific questions and their 
relevancy to the industry were worked on.  
 We made use of existing social networks to contact representatives of various 
organizations and earn their trust. Bearing in mind the secretive nature of the diamond 
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industry, especially in China, we used various connections and ultimately managed to 
obtain access to four organizations who provided us with access to conduct 
interviews. These included: (1) the owner manager of a large Chinese diamond firm 
with a strong presence in Chinese local markets; (2) the owner manager of a foreign 
diamond firm operating in China who is a member of the Tel-Aviv and Antwerp trade 
bourses; (3) a manager of the office of the Israel Diamond Exchange (IDE) in China; 
and (4) a well-known Israeli analyst and reporter on the diamond industry who wrote 
extensively on the diamond industry and China.  
 Prior to the fieldwork, we collected data from journals, books, industry 
magazines, official government data and interviews with government officials. The 
case study approach to theory building was used to develop the pathways, 
propositions (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1994) and further examine the GRX scale’s 
suitability within this context. During the interviews, we applied an open-ended 
protocol presented in Table 1. Open - ended questions are widely accepted as an 
appropriate technique for gathering data on cultural issues, especially when hard data 
is difficult to come by and the research is exploratory in nature (McCracken, 1988). 
Open-ended questions in our case allowed interviewees to elaborate on cultural and 
ethical issues, trade mechanisms and issues relating to business and governance 
surrounding the industry. The interviewer requested further information when a theme 
was vague or incomplete and posed supplementary questions as needed to obtain 
more precise and in-depth responses. The GRX scale was presented and feedback was 
gathered in order to format the questions relating to the industry. The researchers 
emphasized to all respondents that their comments would remain anonymous. All 
interviews were transcribed as due to the secrecy of the industry none of the 
respondents were willing to be recorded. All interviews were conducted in English 
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except those with the representatives of the Israel Diamond Exchange, which were 
conducted in Hebrew. 
 Using a qualitative research approach, we sought to highlight the importance 
of the contextual elements needed to understand and analyze the industry. The 
objectives of the qualitative study were : (1) to understand the frame of reference and 
situation surrounding the respondent; (2) to examine the industry’s organizational and 
business processes; and (3) to determine those factors peculiar to the industry that 
improve understanding of causality. The principle behind the qualitative approach is 
that it reflects most accurately the respondents’ perceptions of the events that take 
place in the industry. Furthermore, in order to research trust, one needs to create trust.  
 To further validate the qualitative data, a quantitative study was conducted 
utilizing the GRX scale. At the second stage, a database of diamond firms operating in 
China was generated from sources that included the Israeli Diamond Exchange (IDE), 
the Diamond Administration of China (DAC), and the Belgium Diamond Exchange 
(BDE). Information was collected from a total of 425 privately owned firms. These 
were typically diamond traders that imported polished diamonds or made jewelry 
from them for resale. The respondent managers were all involved in the import of 
polished diamonds. There is no local production of diamonds in China. To bolster the 
response rate, we utilized the networks of a number of very large Israeli diamond 
firms that have extensive operations in China. We then contacted various Chinese 
firms that they did business with, to determine their willingness to participate in the 
study. Those participants who expressed an interest in taking part in the study were e-
mailed a copy of the survey. A follow-up phone call was made to ensure that the 
participants had received the initial e-mail and were able to open the attachment. 
Then, two weeks later a second follow up phone call was made to those who had not 
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replied. Out of a total of 252 questionnaires that were sent out, 212 were returned, 
yielding an 84% response rate. We believe this was achieved thanks to the extreme 
care taken in managing this process.   
 The questionnaire was drafted in both English and Chinese. Interviews were 
conducted in English. As the official language in the diamond industry is English 
(Even-Zohar, 2007) and all the firms interviewed purchased their diamonds from 
overseas suppliers. We found communication in English was not a problem for our 
respondents. The measurement scales for Ganqing, Renqing and Xinren were 
captured using five-point Likert scales, anchored from 1 "strongly disagree" to 5 
"strongly agree" based on the GRX scale (see Appendix B). Furthermore, we 
incorporated questions from Yen and Barnes (2011) to measure Satisfaction and 
Performance. The reliability of the scales was tested using internal consistency 
measures (Cronbach alpha coefficients). Questions 1 – 7 measured the extent to which 
the Chinese diamond firms felt they had Ganqing in exchange with other Chinese 
firms; questions 8 – 15 measured the extent to which the Chinese diamond firms felt 
they had Renqing with their Chinese partners; questions 16 – 23 measured whether 
the Chinese diamond firms felt they had mutual Xinren with their Chinese partners, 
and questions 24 – 26 measured Satisfaction and Performance. 
 
Data Analysis and Findings 
In the first stage, as with all qualitative research, this study had to make assumptions 
about both the accuracy of the respondents' recollections and their candor. As far as 
possible, the various sources of information were cross-checked. We then analyzed 
the data to identify key themes, with the aim of constructing a comprehensive model 
of the Chinese diamond industry and the forces affecting it. The data was further 
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analyzed by industry experts in order to minimize bias arising from the researchers' 
preconceptions of the industry. The difficulty of obtaining access to executives is well 
known (Li et al., 2009; Yeager and Kram, 1990). In our case, this difficulty was 
compounded by the need for face-to-face interviews and by the secretive nature of the 
industry in general, not to mention the known reluctance of Chinese officials and 
managers in Chinese diamond firms to make information available to the public.  
 The interviews, which lasted on average two hours confirmed previous 
findings by Li et al. (2009) that trade in the Chinese diamond market involves some 
degree of fraud and corruption than in other international diamond markets. This was 
highlighted by the following response: “I would rather do business with a person I do 
not know or trust … it makes business less complicated”. Since many diamonds are 
smuggled into China, Chinese SMEs tend not to have confidence in the legal 
infrastructure. This was highlighted by the following response: “As the legal system 
takes a long time to reach a verdict, which I do not always understand, I do not use it 
… We are a cash flow business, delays in cash flow means life or death in this 
business”. Another respondent commented: “Resolving conflict in our business is 
problematic … you understand me … this is why I only do cash transactions … there are 
no refunds”.  
 Surprisingly, in contrast to other Chinese industries, the findings here suggest 
that social networks function poorly. This was highlighted by the following comment: 
“The Chinese way of doing business is through Guanxi … keeping one's word is very 
important in-order to keep one's 'face' … but in this industry it is very problematic”. 
The interview data indicated that Chinese diamond firms do not believe that Ganqing, 
Renqing and Xinren are necessary in the Chinese diamond industry. It was even noted 
that in most cases, it does not exist, or in extreme cases can damage business, as 
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illustrated by one of the companies stating: “The sales person is only concerned with 
making profit … I understand it so I do not trust them … it’s only business”.  
 The lack of Renqing, the reciprocity side of guanxi, was highlighted by one 
respondent: “I do not like it when a client or supplier asks for a favor, I feel pressured 
to comply, you understand that it is our culture … but in the end I find a polite way to 
refuse….. in this industry a promise is not worth anything … cash talks”.  As exchange 
is highly transactional and a short term view is undertaken, Xinren, the trust component 
of Guanxi, seems to be non-existent as illustrated by the following powerful remark: “I 
have no loyalty to work with any supplier or client … I work with who gives me the best 
price … you understand that this industry is very competitive…. I do not want to have a 
feeling of obligation to any supplier or customer, it hurts the business”. 
 In the second stage, before undertaking a principal components analysis 
(PCA), the scale reliabilities and relationships between the items were examined. The 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for the Ganqing (7 item) scale was 0.82, the Renqing (6 
item) scale was 0.88 and for the Xinren (7 item) scale was .05. After studying the 
inter-item correlations for the Xinren items, we discovered that items x4 to x7 were 
problematic as they had negligible and sometimes negative correlations. As a result 
we excluded these from any further analysis. The remaining three items x1 to x3 had a 
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.73.   
 The PCA was then administered using 17 items, 7 for Ganqing, 6 for Renqing 
and 3 for Xinren. The Kaiser-Meyer-Oklin (KMO) value was .68, which exceeds the 
recommended threshold of .60 (Kaiser, 1960) and the Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was 
statistically significant (p<.001) (Bartlett, 1950). The analysis revealed 4 factors with 
eigenvalues greater than 1, explaining 41%, 14%, 9% and 8% of the variance 
respectively. The Scree plot inflexion point fell between the second and third 
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component suggesting the 3rd and 4th components should be considered for rejection 
(Cattel, 1966). Velicer’s minimum average partial (MAP) test and the revised MAP 
test (Velicer et al., 2000) showed that 2 or 3 components exist respectively. Parallel 
analysis meanwhile showed that 4 components exist (Lautenschlager, 1989). In view 
of these results, another PCA was run limiting the number of components to 2, 3 and 
4, the results of which are presented in Table 1. 
 
=== 
Insert Table 1 here 
=== 
As shown in Table 1, one factor emerged clearly in all variations, where R1-R5 
consistently had high loadings on factor 1. Looking at the case of 3 and 4 factors, the 
second component was also consistent, where G1, G2, G4, G6 and G7 had high 
loadings on this component. Unexpectedly, R6 had a high loading on this component 
as well, even though from a theoretical point of view it does not belong to the same 
scale. X1-X3 were highly loaded on the third component. G5 had a moderate loading 
on the third component in the 3-factor scheme, but when the fourth factor was 
introduced, G3 and G5 had high loadings on the fourth component. In view of these 
results, it seemed reasonable to eliminate the exceptional items from the analysis. A 
new PCA was then run using the following items: R1-R5; G1, G2, G4, G6, G7 and 
X1-X3. The results are shown in Table 2.  
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=== 
Insert Table 2 here 
=== 
As seen in Table 2, after removing the exceptional variables, three components with 
eigenvalues greater than 1 emerged clearly and were designated as R, G and X. In 
order to validate the extracted factors, CFA using AMOS was performed with 5 items 
for Ganqing, 5 for Renqing and 3 for Xinren. Given the sample size (212), it was not 
expected that statistical insignificance of the χ2 test could be achieved easily. Hence, 
the adequacy of the model specification relied mainly on fit indices, specifically the 
CFI, GFI, IFI, TLI being greater than 0.90, and RMSEA being less than 0.08 (Byrne, 
2001).  
 As a preliminary analysis, the model was tested for common method bias 
(CMB) using Harman’s single factor test (Podsakoff, et al. 2003). While this test does 
not prove there is no CMB (Antonakis et al., 2010), positive results of the existence of 
a single factor could make the data unusable. The test revealed no significant bias. 
Further clarifications regarding common method bias and variance (CMV) is provided 
later. The initial CFA for the 13 item model revealed inadequate fit indices: 
χ2(62)=648, p=.000, GFI=.726, CFI=.714, IFI=.716, TLI=.640, RMSEA=.212. In 
order to improve the conceptual model, it was incrementally modified (in order of 
priority): (a) removing items that had the lowest inter-item correlations, (b) removing 
items that had the lowest factor loadings (Cadogan et al., 2006) and (c) allowing 
residual errors to covariate, thus assuming common-method variance existed. This 
process continued until adequate fit was achieved. The final model is presented in 
Figure 3. This model consists of 3 items for Ganqing (G1, G2, G6), 3 for Renqing 
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(R2, R3, R4), and 2 for the Xinren scale (X1, X2). The model fit indices passed the 
expected threshold: GFI=.953, CFI=.970, IFI=.970, TLI=.942, RMSEA=.08.  
 In Figure 3, R3 has a slight loading on Xinren, suggesting that R3 has a small 
component related to credibility. This anomaly will be touched upon further in the 
discussion section. Also, covariance between some of the residuals is not zero, 
implying that some common method variance exists between the three manifest 
variables, which is known as a correlated uniqueness factor (Podsakoff et al., 2003). 
However, comparing factor loadings and correlations between the models with and 
without the uniqueness factor, revealed that the differences were all below .03, 
suggesting that despite common method variance, the bias was indeed negligible 
(Meade et al., 2007). In summary, these findings suggest that the model presented in 
Figure 3 provides a reasonable representation of the measurement scales used. 
=== 
Insert Figure 3 here 
=== 
Finally, following on from the results of the CFA, we tested our concept (Figure 1) 
using structural equation modelling. Overall, the findings reveal that the data by and 
large fits the model well: χ2(4)=7.90, p=.095, GFI=.973, IFI=.971, TLI=.925, 
CFI=.970, RMSEA=.095. As can be seen, all the fit indices suggest a good fit except 
for the RMSEA, which is above the .08 threshold. However, one reason for this is that 
this fit index can often reject good models, particularly when the sample size is less 
than 200, or when the number of degrees of freedom is small - the latter being the 
case in our study (Curran et al., 2003; Hu and Bentler, 1999; Kenny et al., 2013). We 
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are therefore able to conclude that Figure 4 provides a useful representation of the 
pathways posited leading to Performance.  
=== 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
=== 
Figure 4 does not consider a direct relationship between Xinren and Performance. 
Bearing in mind the low-trust nature surrounding the diamond industry in China, we 
therefore decided to run an alternate rival model, whereby we added this link in as a 
further pathway. The model and statistics are presented in Figure 5. This model had 
12 free parameters while the number of cases was 252, yielding a ratio of a bit less 
than 10 participants per free parameter. Kline (2005) recommends a desirable ratio of 
the number of cases to the number of free parameters of 20:1, yet he believes a more 
realistic ratio of 10:1 is acceptable. Others have suggested 5:1 (Bentler and Chou, 
1987). Adding to this, that the model in Figure 5 had only 3 degrees of freedom, 
further questions the fit indices as these are influenced by the number of cases or the 
degrees of freedom. Indeed, the model revealed good fit indices: χ2(3)=2.30, p=.511, 
GFI=.992, CFI=1.0, implying it can be considered a good representation of the data. 
The non-normed fit indices exceeded 1.0, namely: TLI=1.018, IFI=1.005 and the 
RMSEA=.000.  
 Although these statistics appear peculiar, one should bear in mind that TLI and 
IFI being non-normed fit indices can both exceed 1 (Kline, 2005; Tucker and Lewis, 
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1973)
1
. This is specifically true when the χ2/DF of the proposed model is low relative 
to the value of χ2/DF for the null model, or when the χ2/DF of the model is less than 
the DF (both occurred in the current case χ2/DF=13.97 for the null model vs. 0.77 for 
the proposed model). The RMSEA of .000 does not indicate a perfect fit (i.e. χ2=0), 
rather it indicates that the χ2<DF (Kline, 2005). Comparing the two models revealed a 
significant change (Δχ2(1)=5.6, p=.02). 
 In examining this rival model, our findings reveal that Satisfaction plays a full 
mediating role between Renqing and Performance, while Ganqing has a direct path to 
Performance. It can be further observed that the path between Xinren and 
Performance is negative and significant (-.23, p=.003) suggesting high levels (or low 
levels) of personal trust, lead to lower (or increased) Performance. However, Xinren 
has a positive indirect effect on Performance via Renqing and Ganqing (.26, p=.002). 
In brief, the model illustrated in Figure 5 appears to represent the relationships 
adequately, but needs to be treated cautiously due to the marginal number of cases.  
 Collectively Figures 4 and 5 support our hypotheses (see Table 3), the indirect 
effect between Renqing and Performance was significant in both cases (.27** and 
.17** in Figures 4 and 5 respectively). In summarizing the findings taken from our 
sample relating to the Chinese diamond industry, the data suggests that while Ganqing 
and Renqing positively contribute to the improvement of business relationship 
Performance, Xinren appears more problematic, as the SEM results confirm a 
negative relationship with Performance.   
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=== 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
=== 
=== 
Insert Table 3 about here 
=== 
 
Discussion 
In terms of the study’s implications for academics and scholars, the findings confirm 
that Xinren serves as a useful pre-requisite for nurturing healthy relationships. 
Renqing and Ganqing also play instrumental roles for enhancing relational outcomes. 
We confirmed the paradox i.e., where a negative direct relationship between Xinren 
and Performance exists, trust can be seen, in the Chinese diamond industry, as a 
negative component. This runs contrary to how business is typically conducted in a 
Chinese relationship context (Guthrie, 1998; Huang and Rice, 2012). The findings are 
in line with those from our qualitative research and also support the work of Li et al.,  
(2009), suggesting that dealing in diamonds in China is somewhat anomalous.  
 Through our preliminary research, we discovered that opportunistic traders 
often buy diamonds tax-free in Hong Kong, then smuggle them into China. The 
process is relatively simple and lucrative. It is also difficult to police, as air, water and 
land routes are busy. One of our sources argued that if he tried to follow the rules and 
stay legal, his business would be uncompetitive. Given the cultural background and 
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the absence of a legal framework to rely upon, the Chinese diamond industry should, 
in theory, follow a socially based model, yet it does not. Why not? Our analyses 
identified five interrelated themes that help explain why exchange in the Chinese 
diamond industry tends to be transactional rather than relational. These are (1) the 
quality of information; (2) opportunistic behavior causing a tension between long-
term and short-term goals; (3) disequilibrium in the market; (4) the absence of 
appropriate legal controls from the De Beers cartel; and (5) governance and the rule of 
law in China. Each of these is now explained and they have implications for scholars, 
practitioners and public policy makers in turn. 
 
Information 
A necessary condition for rule-based governance is that relevant information must be 
accessible to third parties (Eldomiaty and Choi, 2006). In emerging economies such 
as China, information dissemination tends to be less developed and transparent than in 
developed markets (Barnes et al., 2011). Much business, economic and legal 
information in China remains unclear and this causes confusion about such matters 
amidst the country's rapidly changing profile, its market characteristics and 
government policy intentions. Firms with access to policy makers and business 
leaders tend to utilize guanxi influence to obtain a competitive edge (Gu et al., 2008). 
Moreover, guanxi aids in the enforcement of extralegal contracts, as parties to a 
contract are often unwilling to risk their reputation for fear of jeopardizing such 
influential relationships (Bernstein, 1992). In an information-poor environment, in 
theory, Chinese diamond traders should therefore seek to reduce uncertainty by 
relying on social networks, but our research suggests otherwise, a point that this study 
addresses.  
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 The development of guanxi networks also relies on information and 
specifically, information about potential trading partners (Tam, 2002). As the Chinese 
diamond industry is relatively new, our interviewees claimed that most large 
diamantaires in the industry were either foreign owned or local Chinese newcomers. 
The foreign owned companies offer only a weak base for guanxi creation. The 
Chinese diamantaires have very little trading history (credibility or Xinren) and have 
had little opportunity to build strong guanxi networks (Hwang et al., 2009). It was 
considered that good records relating to a firm’s trading history would substitute for 
personal knowledge, but firms tend not to make such information available. 
Diamantaires therefore have little to go on in judging the trustworthiness of their 
trading partners. This represents a significant point that can affect new industries in 
the Chinese business landscape and become an avenue for future research endeavors. 
Our study also found that poor information affects the market in other ways. For 
instance, there is no such thing as accurate pricing information in the Chinese retail 
diamond market.  
Opportunistic Behavior 
Simultaneous exchange has many advantages for merchants (Berger et al., 2013). 
Cash transactions reduce the risk associated with credit. They also minimize 
transaction costs by eliminating time-consuming negotiations over payment terms, 
which forgo the need for contracts (Scott and Yelowitz, 2010). Such exchange makes 
it easier for dealers to trade with people who they have little information about 
(Bernstein, 1992). However, in most modern business scenarios, simultaneous 
exchange like this is not common, as exchange partners often trust each other to a 
certain extent (Berger and Herstein, 2012) or have trust in the legal system to protect 
them in case of dispute. So why is the Chinese diamond industry different? An 
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effective social network based on trust reduces the likelihood that dealers will engage 
in opportunistic behavior, especially in a business environment where laws and law 
enforcement are weak (Tam, 2002). Such networks have long been active in the 
global diamond industry. For instance, Orthodox Jews for centuries would lend sacks 
of jewels to one another for examination without relying on legal documentation 
(Bernstein, 1992; Spar, 1994).  
 The unique qualities of diamonds mean that big profits can be made fast if the 
merchant does not worry too much about ethical behavior (Bernstein, 1992). 
Interviewees claimed that business disputes can easily arise due to differing views 
relating to the valuation of diamonds. Furthermore, there may be a propensity to cheat 
with little possibility of legal address. Therefore, when disputes arise and they involve 
substantial sums of money, they can be intense. Respondents claimed that indeed, 
under market pressure, some traders cheat both international and domestic mainland 
customers. However, the cost of developing and maintaining guanxi networks which 
might penalize such behavior, is high and requires long-term commitment. It seems 
therefore, that in some cases, the costs of maintaining such networks outweigh the 
perceived benefits, which causes the system to break down. This finding may question 
the long term prevalence of Chinese business models based on guanxi or social 
networks (Guthrie, 1998).  
 
Disequilibrium 
Corruption can be found in any economic system, but the guanxi system provides 
fertile soil for it to flourish (Gu et al., 2008). In a society such as China, with a long 
tradition of rule by man instead of law, it has always been vital to have good guanxi 
with officials and prominent business people. A significant number of business to 
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government relationships in China are tainted by some element of corruption (Fan, 
2002; Yang, 1994). This has led to disequilibrium between firms that have access to 
privileged information and sources of finance and those that do not (Lu, 2009). This 
two-tier system means that the diamond industry is dominated by a small number of 
insiders, mainly former state owned organisations (SOEs), which alone have access to 
credit (some 80% of loans are extended to current or former SOEs) (Even Zohar, 
2007). Our interviewees claimed that the private sector or those outside the social 
network find it almost impossible to secure finance, implying that they must rely on 
cash-based transactions or on unethical conduct in order to survive. The lack of access 
to credit presents huge barriers to expansion in both the polished and rough diamond 
markets, because polished diamonds sales are highly seasonal, with 30 to 40% 
occurring in November and December. Credit is therefore needed in order to avoid 
cash shortfalls during the rest of the year. As a result, a few large insiders do business 
among themselves and outsiders do what they can to survive which may result in 
unethical behavior.  
 
Lack of extralegal controls (the historical role of DeBeers)  
Scott and Yelowitz (2010) have shown that the supply side of the diamond market is 
characterized by a tight upstream cartel - from mine to retailer and downstream 
competition - retailer to client. The De Beers family of companies, which presided 
over the production and trade in unpolished diamonds, may have been the most 
successful and long-lasting cartel in the world (Spar, 1994). The cartel has managed 
to convince consumers that diamonds are both valuable and scarce, and that they 
should be purchased based on quality rather than price (Hart, 2001).  
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 De Beers has a reputation for aggressive action against anybody threatening 
the long-term stability of the diamond industry (Berger, 1999). Presently, China has 
no De Beers ‘sight holders’ i.e. firms authorized to purchase rough diamonds directly 
from De Beers. Furthermore, Chinese diamantaires cannot buy from De Beers sight 
holders, as De Beers has made an ability to supply market information a prerequisite 
for such sales (Bernstein, 1992). Unlike banks, sight holders are industry insiders, 
they have good information about individual dealers’ reputations, and conduct 
business with the same people on a repeated basis over a long period of time. It is thus 
cheaper for sight holders to monitor dealers' reputations and credit-worthiness than it 
is for banks and other firms to do so (Spar, 1994). Our respondents offered some 
insights into why De Beers never developed a hold in the Chinese diamond market. 
Our interviewees argued that the specific characteristics of the Chinese diamond 
industry, and in particular, the role of the Chinese government, would make control of 
this market almost impossible. The lack of extralegal enforcement mechanisms in the 
Chinese diamond industry, helps explain why China’s diamond trade is based not on 
trust but on opportunism.  
 
Governance  
Business disputes arise in all industries with the diamond industry being no exception 
(Li et al., 2009). Diamond valuation is a subjective process, and therefore is 
vulnerable to dishonesty (Bernstein, 1982). The interviewees claimed that diamond 
transactions and price-value tie-ups are expensive i.e., firms are understandably 
reluctant to see their cash tied up in long legal disputes. They further highlighted that 
the prevalence of smuggling in the Chinese diamond industry also reduces the ability 
of diamond merchants to enforce legal contracts. Moreover, enforcement of contracts 
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has always been more difficult to implement in international businesses than in 
domestic markets.  
 During our interviews, it became clear that many players in China’s diamond 
industry circumvent the country’s complex regulations where they can. For example, 
acquiring an official license to undertake transactions of diamonds in China is a 
complicated process involving many steps and different government agencies. It is 
difficult, if not impossible for firms to enter the industry without circumventing the 
system through a business-to-government guanxi network. As many governance 
researchers have noted the more difficult and expensive it is to enter an industry, the 
more likely it is to be corrupt, as there is a need to ‘oil the wheels’ to get things done 
(Bernstein, 1992; Bushman et al., 2004; Li et al., 2009; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993).  
 The Chinese diamond industry therefore fails to meet the basic characteristic 
of rule-based societies, namely, that the rules are fair, transparent, and universally 
applied. To reduce uncertainty under these conditions, Chinese merchants have not 
tended to turn to social networks, but to simultaneous exchange. In sum, our research 
and interviews suggest that relational governance does not exist in the Chinese 
diamond industry. This is partly because of the size and complexity of the market, 
partly for historical, social and cultural reasons, but also partly because of the lure of 
quick profits through cheating that erodes trust within the industry. Table 4 
summarizes the reasons for the paradox in the Chinese diamond industry. 
======= 
Insert Table 4 here 
======== 
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In terms of implications specific for policy makers, there is a need to put mechanisms 
in place to halt unethical practices such as counterfeiting as quickly as possible. A 
start has been made through new legal implementation measures and the revamping of 
the Chinese legal system i.e., making laws more interpretable and implementable, as 
well as introducing more professionally qualified judges to replace former party 
members, thus moving in-line with Western practice. Second, work must be 
undertaken to create a more transparent governance structure that promotes good 
business practices and end inappropriate government involvement in such industries. 
Currently this is somewhat problematic, as through state intervention the Chinese 
government traditionally has controlled the economy by creating laws and making 
them open to different interpretation in an ever changing bureaucratic manner. The 
ability to find a balance between governmental needs i.e., control and building trust in 
an impartial legal system is crucial for further enhancing the evolution of the Chinese 
economy. 
 
Conclusion, Limitations and Future Research  
In the wider literature, there has been a wide range of research on the significance of 
networking in advancing strategic capabilities (Huang and Rice, 2012). While we 
understand the noteworthy benefits resulting from the openness of China internally 
and to the West, our study has uncovered a number of potentially negative impacts 
that are emerging during China’s transitional phase.  
Specifically, we investigated the Chinese diamond industry as a case study and 
found that the relationship between interpersonal trust and performance is negative, 
which further supports the claim that the lack of reliable well-enforced laws 
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encourages opportunistic behavior. This may lead to an overemphasis on market-
oriented values in the pursuit of profit, conflicting with the embraced positive virtues 
of guanxi norms (Huang and Rice, 2012). Hence, in transitional economies, the 
official and unofficial business models offer an interesting context for exploring such 
factors and their influence on firm performance. We discuss the emergence of an 
interesting paradox in the diamond industry that brings about problematic outcomes 
and relational dilemmas for a country in rapid transition.  
 The case study of the Chinese diamond industry shows that a strong profit 
motive, coupled with an outsider’s incomplete understanding of the role of 
government and the lack of legally enforced rules may hinder business. Even where 
merchants want to act ethically, our respondents suggest that the state's predatory 
policy forces them to violate laws and regulations in order to survive. Due to its 
infrastructure loosening characteristics, we worry if this could penetrate to other 
industries in the same way it has influenced the Chinese diamond industry, thus 
damaging growth prospects and credibility.  We call for further research to examine 
such effects on other important Chinese industries in order to better understand their 
potential uniqueness. 
 A limitation in this study is its cross-sectional single-source design. This may 
raise concern regarding CMB. This issue has been partially mitigated using Harman’s 
single factor test and a correlated uniqueness factor test (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Yet, 
self-reports may be biased due to social desirability (for example). Future research 
using multiple sources and a longitudinal design can further try to validate the 
proposed model and alleviate this bias. Path analysis does not prove causality, only 
implies it. We can only cautiously talk about antecedents and consequences based on 
our theoretical knowledge. Yet the good fit indices of the path analyses indicate that 
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the theoretical model underlying it may be appropriate. Future research should 
therefore focus on a longitudinal design in order to validate any causality.  
 The role of public trust was not examined in the study, albeit, the findings did 
have implications for this in the public sphere. Future research should aim to build on 
personal trust in this study and include the construct of public trust in order to 
compare and contrast both dimensions. Research in this area may prove fruitful for 
scholars, public policy makers and industry at large. We posit that the speed of 
development and growth of the Diamond industry in China may have had an 
accelerating effect, and it would be worthwhile to study this aspect in other industrial 
sectors that have expanded very rapidly. Research advancing this area in different 
industrial contexts is likely to be highly valued among members of both the academic 
and practitioner communities. 
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Figure 2: The Structure of the Chinese Diamond Industry
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Figure 4: The Concept 
 
 
** p<.01, *** p<.001. N=212. 
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Figure 5: The Rival  
 
 
** p<.01, *** p<.001. N=212. 
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Table 1: Varimax rotated component matrix with the number of components 
constrained to 2, 3 and 4 
 
No. of Components 2 
 
3 
 
4 
Variable 1 2 
 
1 2 3 
 
1 2 3 4 
G1 .334 .720 
 
.235 .732 .330 
 
.196 .755 .319 .219 
G2 .380 .594 
 
.244 .795 .108 
 
.250 .799 .060 -.062 
G3 .463 .147 
 
.452 .161 .081 
 
.332 .189 .156 .774 
G4 .151 .767 
 
.070 .675 .433 
 
.033 .702 .426 .198 
G5 .151 .543 
 
.162 .257 .507 
 
.263 .265 .422 -.627 
G6 .154 .807 
 
.091 .636 .523 
 
.108 .658 .479 -.135 
G7 .539 .531 
 
.424 .712 .107 
 
.408 .721 .077 .090 
R1 .823 .139 
 
.815 .187 .070 
 
.795 .198 .068 .177 
R2 .867 .187 
 
.854 .236 .093 
 
.840 .248 .083 .142 
R3 .804 .275 
 
.834 .129 .302 
 
.842 .148 .284 .010 
R4 .833 .060 
 
.833 .125 .020 
 
.868 .125 -.019 -.159 
R5 .813 .253 
 
.810 .229 .184 
 
.819 .241 .159 -.005 
R6 .289 .411 
 
.167 .647 -.010 
 
.224 .636 -.087 -.377 
X1 -.230 .684 
 
-.121 -.035 .934 
 
-.092 .005 .921 -.193 
X2 .201 .577 
 
.243 .179 .626 
 
.224 .214 .631 .123 
X3 .273 .641 
 
.309 .239 .662 
 
.291 .276 .663 .120 
            G = Ganqing; R = Renqing; X = Xinren 
 
Eigenvalues 
 
 
 
6.55 
 
 
2.25 
 
 
1.39 
 
 
1.35 
Explained Variance 
 
41% 14% 8.7% 8.5% 
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Table 2: Rotated component matrix - post removal of variables 
 
 
Component 
1(R) 2(G) 3(X) 
R4 .865 .061 .014 
R2 .851 .262 .075 
R3 .842 .169 .288 
R5 .812 .248 .120 
R1 .805 .215 .045 
G1 .206 .818 .207 
G2 .269 .791 -.009 
G4 .054 .756 .359 
G6 .099 .736 .362 
G7 .435 .702 .050 
X1 -.121 .090 .905 
X3 .296 .287 .696 
X2 .235 .227 .682 
     
Eigenvalues 5.93 2.18 1.28 
Explained 
Variance 45.6% 16.8% 9.8% 
(G = Ganqing; R = Renqing; X = Xinren) 
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Table 3: Estimation results of the concept 
** p<.01, *** p<.001. X- Xinren, R- Renqing, G- Ganqing, Per- Performance, 
Sat- Satisfaction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Path Hypothesis Sign Standardized 
Estimates 
p-
value 
Result 
X      G H1 + .52 *** Supported 
X      R H2 + .33 ** Supported 
R      Sat H3 + .45 *** Supported 
Sat       Per H4 + .61 *** Supported 
G       Per H5 + .17 ** Supported 
R      Per  + .27 (indirect 
effect) 
** Supported 
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Table 4: Basic Constructs of the Paradox in the Chinese Diamond Industry 
 
 
 
  
The China Case Global Diamond Industries Theory Source of Paradox 
No reliable 
information 
Low availability of 
information 
When information is 
unavailable, social 
networks should emerge 
Information 
A one-off deal market 
mindset with a view 
toward getting rich 
fast  
A long-term business 
mindset with a view 
toward reducing 
transactional costs 
When simultaneous 
exchange is not viable, 
social networks should 
emerge, especially when 
governance is weak 
Opportunism 
As some firms have 
access to financial 
markets and 
government influence 
and others do not, the 
latter must even the 
playing field however 
they can 
The diamond industry has 
opted out of formal legal 
mechanisms and has 
created effective external 
legal governance 
mechanisms 
When advantage cannot be 
attained through ethical 
conduct, small firms will 
use any tools at their 
disposal to survive 
 
 
Disequilibrium 
An inefficient legal 
system has led to a 
transactional trade 
mechanism 
As a result of a slow-
moving legal system, the 
diamond industry has 
opted out and created an 
unofficial but fast 
enforcement mechanism 
A transactional exchange 
mechanism should emerge 
under efficient legal 
governance and efficient 
implementation 
Governance 
Both formal and 
informal governance 
mechanisms are 
ineffective   
As a result of a slow-
moving legal system, the 
diamond industry has 
opted out and created an 
efficient alternative 
governance mechanism 
When formal governance 
is weak an external legal 
mechanism will emerge 
Lack of control by De 
Beers cartel 
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Appendix A: Interview guide 
1. Can you give me an overview of how business is done in the Chinese diamond 
industry? 
2. Who are the major players in the industry and how do they interact with each 
other? 
3. How do you see government intervention in the Chinese diamond industry? 
4. How important are business ethics and guanxi in business transactions in the 
industry? 
5. What sort of problems have you seen arise? 
6. How do firms cope with these issues? 
7. Please have a look at this (GRX) questionnaire, is it understandable and 
relevant? Do you have any comments on it? 
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Appendix B: The Questionnaire 
Strongly 
disagree 
 Neutral  Strongly 
agree 
Ganqing  
     I often interact with the person whom I do business with, on a social basis outside of work 1 
     The person whom I do business with and I are able to talk openly as friends  2 
     If I were to change this business connection, the contact person and company I do business with, I would lose a good 
friend  
3 
     I consider the contact person and company I do business with as being almost as close to me as family 4 
     I would consider whether my contact person’s feelings and company I do business with would be hurt before I made 
an important decision 
5 
     I have a brotherhood feeling toward the contact person and company I do business with 6 
     I would try my best to help out my contact person and company I do business with when he/she is in need because 
he/she is a friend of mine 
7 
     Renqing  
     I feel a sense of obligation to the contact person and the company I do business with for doing him/her a favor 8 
     I think that "calling " favors is part of doing business with the contact person and the company I do business with 9 
     The practice of "give and take" (exchanging favors) is a key part of the relationship between the contact person of the 
company I do business with and me  
10 
     I would feel embarrassed if I was unable to provide a requested favor to the contact person and the company I do 
business with  
11 
     I know that it is bad business not to return favors to the contact person and the company I do business with  12 
     I am happy to do a favor for the contact person of the company I do business with, when he/she requests one 13 
     The contact person and company I do business with is essential and critical to my company's future performance 14 
     My company is dependent on the other company, with whom we do business with 15 
     Xinren  
     The contact person and company I do business with have been frank in dealing with us 16 
     The contact person and company I do business with does not make false claims 17 
     We think that the contact person of the side we work with is completely open in dealing with us 18 
     The contact person and company I do business with is only concerned about themselves  19 
     The contact person and company I  do business with seems to be concerned with me and our company needs 20 
     The people at my firm do not trust the contact person and company we do business with 21 
     The contact person and company I do business with is not trustworthy 22 
     The contact person and company I do business with stand by their promises to our company 23 
     Satisfaction and Performance  
     Profitability of our company has grown due to the contact person and the company we do business with 24 
     The relationship with this company helps us perform better financially  25 
     We are very satisfied with the working relationship of the other company, with whom we do business with 26 
